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Objectives: China has implemented the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) in rural 
area since 2003 to provide financial protection to its rural population. This paper explores the 
effect of NCMS on relieving catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) among the poor or non-
poor groups.  
 
Methods: Questionnaire survey was conducted in three counties, with a random sample of 
358 poor and 523 non-poor NCMS enrollees who used inpatient services and obtained 
NCMS reimbursement in 2005.  
 
Results: Majority of NCMS enrollees suffered CHE due to using inpatient services, whilst 
the occurrence and intensity of CHE was greater among poor inpatients. NCMS reimburse-
ment helped relieve CHE to a certain degree. Poor inpatients benefited more from NCMS 
than non-poor, but the effects varied among counties. Cost control measures and other medi-
cal financial assistance helped reduce inpatients’ economic burden. 
 
Conclusions: The objective of NCMS is only partly achieved. However, it has promoted eq-
uity in health financing as poor inpatients can acquire more protection than non-poor. Our 
analysis suggests efforts should be made to strengthen cost containment, improve NCMS de-
sign and extend other medical financial assistance to further relieve economic burden of dis-
ease. 





In recent years, there has been a worldwide escalation in health expenditure (Okunade and 
Suraratdecha, 2000; World Health Organization, 2008). Meanwhile, many developing coun-
tries are increasingly relying on user fees to fund healthcare services (Newbrander  et al, 
2001). As a result, high costs of health services place a heavy burden on patients. Health in-
surance has been seen as an effective way to contain healthcare costs and reduce economic 
burdens due to illness (Jakab and Krishnan, 2001; Mills and Bennett, 2002; Ahmed et al, 
2005). From the 1950s, China developed a community-based health insurance system called 
the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) in the rural areas. At one time CMS covered over 
90% of the rural population who were therefore able to access basic health services at afford-
able prices (Bloom and Tang, 1999; Qicheng et al, 1999; Yip and Hsiao, 2008). Unfortu-
nately, CMS collapsed during the transition towards a market-oriented economy at the end of 
1970s. Nearly 80% of rural residents were not covered by any form of health insurance by 
2003 and had to pay for health care out-of-pocket (Ministry of Health, 2005). Meanwhile, 
according to China’s National Health Surveys in 1998 and 2003, rural residents’ health ex-
penditure grew at an annual rate of 11.48%, four times faster than their net income over the 
same period. High healthcare expenses in the absence of financial protection have impover-
ished many rural households. Out-of-pocket health payment is taken to be catastrophic when 
a household must reduce its basic expenditure over a period of time to cope with health costs 
(Xu et al, 2003). Several studies revealed that 15-22% of poverty stricken families in rural 
China became poor due to family members’ illness (Ministry of Health, 1999).  These house-
holds often have to borrow money, mortgage or sell assets to pay for healthcare expenses, or 
just forgo treatment (Devadasan et al, 2007; Wang et al, 2005). 
 
The Chinese government re-established the health insurance system - called the New Coop-
erative Medical Scheme (NCMS) – for rural residents in 2003, NCMS is a type of health in-
surance, which is advocated, organized and sponsored by government, with rural residents’ 
voluntary enrolment. One of its prime objectives is to effectively reduce rural people’s eco-
nomic burden of seeking health services and relieve impoverishment through protection 
against catastrophic health expenditure (CHE). To achieve this objective, the NCMS reim-
bursement is mainly for hospitalization expenditure. 
 
International experiences have shown that health insurance can provide protection against 
CHE, though in some countries the effect is partial or limited (Devadasan et al, 2007; Lim-
wattananon et al, 2007; Kawabata, et al, 2002).  However, with the exception of several stu-
dies published in Chinese (Cui et al, 2006; Sun et al, 2007), there has been very limited em-
pirical evidence available on the equity of NCMS in preventing CHE. This paper aims to fill 
this knowledge gap by exploring the impact of NCMS on CHE in poor and non-poor house-




Study sites selection and sampling methods 
This study is a part of the Health VIII Support Project
1
 in China. Three counties which im-
plemented NCMS were selected including Yuexi County in Anhui province, central China; 
Qianjiang County in Chongqing municipality, southwest China; and Datong County in Qing-
hai province, northwest China. All the three counties were poor counties verified by the cen-
tral government. 
In order to estimate and compare the economic burden of disease between poor and non-poor 
NCMS enrollees, the target population in this study was NCMS enrollees who used inpatient 
services and got reimbursement from NCMS in 2005. In Yuexi and Qianjiang, three town-
ships were randomly selected from each county. Considering the sparse population in Qing-
hai province, five townships were randomly selected in Datong County. In each township, the 
NCMS reimbursement database kept in the township health center was used for sampling. 
First, all the eligible population were extracted from the database and divided into two lists of 
poor and non-poor. The poor residents were authorized by the local civil affairs department 
according to local criteria. Then, from each list, a random sample of 50 enrollees was selected 
using systematic sampling method in each township. 10% were added to the sample in case 
there were non-responses. As the total number of poor patients in Qianjiang and Datong were 
less than 150 respectively, all the poor patients were selected. In total, 358 poor inpatients and 
523 non-poor inpatients were interviewed.  
Data collection 
A questionnaire survey was conducted in Oct 2006 among the sampled enrollees by health 
staff from township health centers. Inpatients were asked to recall information concerning 
their hospitalization in the previous year (2005). The questionnaire included questions on 
demographic and socio-economic status (such as age, gender, education, occupation, house-
hold income and expenditure), hospitalization expenditure (including direct medical expenses 
such as inpatient expenditure, self-purchased drug expenditure, and direct non-medical ex-
penses such as transportation and cost occurred by accompanying family members), and 
reimbursement from NCMS and other sources.  
Data analysis 
There are various definitions of CHE, ranging from a total health expenditure of more than 
10% of annual household income (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; Ranson, 2002; Wagstaff and 
Van Doorslaer. 2003), to a total health expenditure exceeding 40% of disposable income (Xu 
et al, 2003; Filmer et al, 2002). In this research, the most common 10% threshold was 
                                                        
1
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aid implementation of a World Bank-financed effort to improve the access to and quality of basic health services 
in rural areas in central and western China. 
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adopted, with the rationale that if a household spends 10% of its annual household expendi-
ture, it is forced to sacrifice other basic needs, sell productive assets, incur debt or become 
impoverished. 
 
In this study, out-of-pocket (OOP) payment for hospitalization, including direct medical ex-
penditure and non-medical expenditure, is used to calculate CHE. Since patients need to pay 
the full expenses out-of-pocket before reimbursement, three scenarios were considered: 1) 
before reimbursement, 2) after reimbursement from NCMS, and 3) after reimbursement from 
NCMS and other sources.  
 
To measure the incidence and intensity of CHE, two indicators proposed by The World Bank 
(O'Donnell et al, 2007) were employed in this research. Head count (H) represents the inci-
dence of catastrophic healthcare payments. In a household, if the health expenditure is T, and 
total expenditure is x, then T/x represents the share health expenditure accounts for. Define an 
indicator, E, which equals 1 if Ti/xi > 10% and zero otherwise. Then an estimate of the head 
count is given by  
 , 
where N is the sample size. 
 
To reflect the intensity of CHE, another indicator, overshoot (O) can be used to capture the 
average degree by which payments exceed the 10% threshold. Define the household over-
shoot as Oi=Ei((Ti/xi-10%)). Then the overshoot is simply the average: 
 . 
Survey data were double inputted into computer using Epi Data 3.0. SPSS 11.5 and Excel 
2007 were employed for data analysis. Where statistical comparisons were made, the signi-
ficance level was set at 0.05.  
Results 
 
This section begins with the study counties’ basic information and the sample’s social eco-
nomic characteristics. It then presents the situation of medical expenditure and reimburse-
ment. Finally, indicators for CHE are calculated to demonstrate the extent to which NCMS 
can provide financial protection for poor and non-poor inpatients.  
Study Counties 
In terms of economic development status (Table 1), Datong was the least poor and Yuexi was 
the poorest. Yuexi and Qianjiang initiated NCMS in 2003, while Datong started NCMS at the 
beginning of 2005. The coverage rates in Yuexi and Datong were above 90%, whilst in Qian-
jiang it was 56%. Premiums in 2005 in these three counties were all 30 Chinese yuan (CNY) 
per capita; 10 CNY from individual enrollees and 20 CNY from central and local govern-
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ment. NCMS reimbursement policies were different in the three counties as shown in Table 2. 
Yuexi and Datong employed a so-called ‘medical savings account’ in NCMS fund. The 10 
Yuan from individual premium were put into the medical savings account for reimbursing 
outpatient expenditure, while the 20 Yuan subsidy from government were put in a risk pool 
for inpatient expenditure. However, Qianjiang county instead adopted a unified fund for both 
outpatient and inpatient reimbursement. The deductible rate in Yuexi and Datong was 100-
500 CNY in hospitals at different levels while no deductible was applied in Qianjiang. The 
reimbursement rate in the three counties was between 30% and 50% according to the level of 
health facilities and medical expenses. Ceilings varied between 800 and 30000 CNY in dif-
ferent level hospitals. 
 
Moreover, Qianjiang has implemented series of cost containment measures in NCMS. In 
terms of provider payment, the health bureau piloted case-based payment for 31 diseases and 
set payment ceilings for inpatient services for 547 diseases. To enable equitable access to 
medicine, an essential drug list was applied in all public health facilities. All the drugs within 
this list should be purchased in a process known as ‘concentrated bidding’, which was in-
tended to help reduce the drug prices. 
 
Besides NCMS, subsidies from other sources also help to reduce poor people’s economic 
burden. The Health VIII Support Project and Civil Affair Bureau provided medical financial 
assistance (MFA) to people in absolute poverty, defined as those whose annual individual in-
come is less than the national poverty line (683 CNY in 2005, equal to 99.85 US dollars). The 
MFA scheme will pay the premium for the absolutely poor population to ensure their enroll-
ment in NCMS, and provide further financial assistance after they obtain NCMS reimburse-
ment  
 
Table 1 socio-economic status in three counties in China, 2005 
 
Table 2 NCMS policies in three counties in China, 2005 
Sample description 
Table 3 presents the socio-economic features of the study sample. The proportion of absolute 
poverty is much higher in Datong than in other two counties (P<0.01). In all three counties, 
total household income per year in poor families was significantly less than the non-poor 
families (P<0.01). However, the difference in annual household expenditure between the two 
groups was only significant in Qianjiang County (P<0.01). In other words, the revenue in 
poor households was less but their expenditure was almost the same as non-poor households 
in sampled counties except in Qianjiang. In all counties, the percentage of households who 
have debt due to illness was higher in the poor (P>0.01), with 76% as an average.  
 
Table 3 Socio-economic features of sampled population, China, 2005 
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Medical expenditure and reimbursement for hospitalisation 
Medical expenditure for impatient services was less than 1800 CNY in Qianjiang County at 
only 1/3 or 1/4 of those in Yuexi and Datong respectively (Table 4). There was no significant 
difference in medical expenditure between the poor and non-poor in Yuexi and Qianjiang. 
However, in Datong County poor patients paid more for hospitalization than the non-poor 
(P<0.01). Direct non-medical expenditure accounted for 14-24% of the total expenditure for 
hospitalization. No significant difference in direct non-medical expenditure was identified 
between the poor and non-poor. The share of total hospitalization expenditure to annual 
household expenditure was 25-58% among the poor patients, which was significantly more 
than the share for the non-poor, at 15-38% (P<0.01). The average reimbursement from 
NCMS was 978 CNY for the poor patients and 625 CNY for the non-poor, accounting for 
26% and 25% of their total hospitalization expenditure respectively. The effective reim-
bursement rate among poor patients was 57.2% in Qianjiang County, higher than the non-
poor (44.3%, P<0.01). In Yuexi and Datong, reimbursement rates were less than 26% and the 
differences between poor and non-poor were not significant.   
 
In addition, people in absolute poverty also received MFA subsidies from the Health VIII 
Support Project and civil affairs bureau. In Datong, poor patients obtained 1441 CNY subsi-
dies related to healthcare in 2005 from MFA. This was much more than other two counties 
(P<0.01).  
 
Table 4 Annual expenditure and reimbursement for hospitalization in three counties, China 
(2005)  
Catastrophic health expenditure 
 
Head count reflects the frequency of the occurrence of CHE. Table 5 shows that more than 
60% of poor inpatients enrolled in NCMS had CHE due to hospitalization in 2005, with the 
highest at 99.2% in Datong County. Among non-poor inpatients, this percentage was relative-
ly low, although it was still more than 78% in Yuexi and Datong. In the second scenario, after 
NCMS reimbursement, Head count decreased greatly in Qianjiang among both poor and non-
poor patients (29.2% and 11.2% respectively), while in Yuexi and Datong, the decrease was 
marginal. In the third scenario, after poor inpatients obtained reimbursement from both 
NCMS and MFA, there was a further reduction of Head count in Datong (4.2%) and Qian-
jiang (2.3%). However, influenced by the missing value, the MFA in Yuexi had hardly any 
effect on lowering Head count.  
 
Table 5 Head count of catastrophic health expenditure in three counties, China, 2005 
 
In addition to head count, intensity of CHE will also have considerable impact on patient’s 
household financial burden. This is measured by overshoot, the average extent to which the 
CHE is above the 10% threshold (Table 6). Before reimbursement, the overshoot was highest 
in Datong (47.8% and 28.0% for the poor and non-poor respectively), and lowest in Qian-
jiang (17% and 8.3%). Table 6 also shows that the overshoot among poor inpatients was 
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much higher than the non-poor inpatients in all three counties. After NCMS reimbursement, 
Overshoot reduced 8-11% among poor inpatients and 3-7% among non-poor inpatients. 
Moreover, in Datong County, reimbursement from MFA was as high as 12.8% of total ex-
penditure. The figure was much lower in Yuexi and Qianjiang (less than 1%).  
 
Table 6 Overshoot of catastrophic health expenditure in three counties, China, 2005 
 
To summarize, before obtaining NCMS reimbursement, the majority of inpatients in three 
counties experienced CHE. Patients in Qianjiang had lower head count and overshoot than 
those in the other two counties. The occurrence and intensity was more substantial in poor 
inpatients than the non-poor group. NCMS reimbursement helped reduce occurrence rate and 
intensity of CHE, but the effects varied among counties. Poor inpatients benefited more from 




The study used a cross-sectional survey to examine the impact of NCMS on CHE. To get a 
reasonable sample size for comparison, the poor and non-poor populations were sampled 
separately and in different probability. The target population was not the whole rural popula-
tion, but only those NCMS enrollees who used inpatient services and obtained reimbursement 
in the year preceding the investigation. Those who were not covered by NCMS and who were 
too poor to afford healthcare services were not included in this study, but they are presumed 
to be the most vulnerable population to CHE (Devadasan et al, 2007; Wang et al, 2005). Fur-
thermore, the study only counted direct out-of-pocket expenditure relevant to hospitalization 
in calculating CHE, and did not include any indirect costs, nor did it include costs for other 
health services. This may underestimate the real economic burden on patients’ households. 
Despite these limitations, we feel confident that the findings of this study shed light on 
NCMS’s role in providing financial protection to the poor. Here we discuss the findings in 
terms of the impacts of NCMS, cost containment measures and other financial assistance on 
relieving CHE.  
 
1. The effect of NCMS 
The aim of NCMS is to relieve enrollees’ economic burden and protect against CHE. From 
the study results, NCMS has partly achieved this objective in reducing CHE. The decline of 
CHE after NCMS reimbursement among the poor was dramatically more than that among the 
non-poor. However, because of the low benefit level and low reimbursement rate, patients, 
both poor and non poor, still faced a very high financial burden even after NCMS reim-
bursement. Limited financial protection was also reported in other health insurances systems 
such as in India (Devadasan et al, 2007). However, the rural residents in China bear a higher 
financial burden of healthcare than countries with similar or higher GDP per capita (Hu et al, 
2008). For example, compared with CHE indicators in some health insurance schemes in 
Vietnam (H=15.1%, O=1.39%) and India (H=3.5-23%, O=9%) (Devadasan et al, 2007; 
O'Donnell et al, 2007), the occurrence and intensity of CHE in China was still much higher 
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after NCMS reimbursement. 
 
Due to policy design, the low effective reimbursement rate in NCMS greatly contributed to 
its limited effect on relieving CHE (Zhang et al, 2009). The NCMS benefit package excluded 
some new and expensive drugs and examinations. But in the fee-for-service payment system, 
doctors still have strong incentives to prescribe these expensive drugs and examinations (Hu 
et al, 2008). Thus, the expenditure within the benefit package was much less than actual ex-
penditure. Moreover, even where healthcare expenditure was eligible for reimbursement, 
policies mandating deductibles, co-payments and ceilings further reduced the proportion of 
effective reimbursement. As a result, this study shows that enrolees had to pay more than half 
of their expenditure on inpatient care out of pocket, with co-payment rates ranging from 50% 
to 65%.  
 
2. Health cost containment on supply side 
High costs of health services cause CHE and undermine the effect of any health insurance 
system in financial protection (Devadasan et al, 2007). The high cost of healthcare in China 
can be attributed to insufficient financial input by government and the fee-for-service pay-
ment mechanism (Yip and Hsiao, 2008; Hu et al, 2008; Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005; 
Ramesh, 2008). By the end of the 1970s, government had taken full responsibility for financ-
ing public hospitals to provide health services. However, in last three decades, subsidies from 
government have been dramatically reducing to less than one third of public hospitals’ reve-
nue. Public hospitals have to heavily rely on user charges for cost recovery (Ramesh, 2008). 
Fee-for-service is the most common provider payment mechanism in China, which encourag-
es health workers to provide unnecessary health services (Yip and Hsiao, 2008; Ramesh, 
2008). This supplier-induced demand, among other factors, has greatly contributed to the es-
calation of health expenditure (Hu et al, 2008). 
 
From international experiences, cost containment measures on the supply side such as use of 
generic drugs, and ceilings on cost of hospitalization are essential and effective in controlling 
and reducing excessive healthcare costs (Mays et al, 2004; Musau, 1999). However, current 
NCMS policy has concentrated more on controlling health cost from the demand side 
(through deductibles, co-payments and ceilings), but less on the supply side. The pilot of 
case-based payment in Qianjiang is an exception. NCMS in Qianjiang employed case-based 
payment for 31 diseases and ceiling payment for 547 diseases for hospitalization, which 
aimed to motivate healthcare providers to control healthcare cost. Drug purchase by concen-
trated bidding also aimed to reduce the prices of basic drugs, and thus constrain the high costs 
of health services due to irrational drug prices. The study results suggest that these supply 
side cost control measures were effective, since the hospitalization expenditure and conse-
quently the economic burden in Qianjiang County was significantly less than the other two 
counties.  
 
3. Medical Financial Assistance  
Our results indicated that inpatients in Datong obtained more reimbursement than other two 
counties from MFA. This further relieved patients’ financial burden after NCMS reimburse-
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ment. This is possibly because more patients in Datong were in absolute poverty who were 
eligible for both types of financial protection (NCMS and MFA). This study found that the 
combination of supplementary financial assistance contributed towards alleviating the fre-
quency and extent of CHE among the absolutely poor in Datong.  Such supplementary assis-
tance remains necessary to protect the absolutely poor from further impoverishment due to 
healthcare costs.  
Conclusion and recommendations 
 
CHE is a major cause of impoverishment in rural China. The NCMS aims to protect its mem-
bers against CHE, but this objective is only partly achieved due to high medical costs and low 
effective reimbursement levels. NCMS has promoted equity in health financing as poor inpa-
tients can acquire more protection than non-poor from NCMS. However, both the headcount 
and overshoot of CHE remain relatively high for the poor and non-poor. 
 
To further enhance the financial protection and reduce CHE, cost containment measures need 
to be strengthened. These should include, but not be limited to supply side measures. A key 
step is to gradually change the current fee-for-service payment system. In addition, NCMS 
benefit package and policy design need to be reconsidered with a focus on increasing the ef-
fective reimbursement rate. Other medial financial assistance programmes may also need to 
be extended, especially for poor and vulnerable group, to supplement the NCMS and help 
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Table 1 Socio-economic status in three counties in China, 2005 
 Yuexi Qianjiang Datong 
Number of townships implementing NCMS 24(100%)  30(100%) 22(100%) 
Enrollees (thousand persons) 320.1 240.9 298.4 
Coverage rate (%) 90.1 56.1 94.8 
GDP (million Chinese yuan) 1857 3654 5433 
Annual net income per capita (million CNY) 1839 2129 2165 




Table 2 NCMS policies in three counties in China, 2005 
County Hospital level Deductible (CNY) Reimbursement rate Ceiling (CNY) 
Yuexi Township 200 50% 3000  
County level 300 40% 10000  
Above county level 500 40% 30000  
Qianjiang Township 0 50% 800  
County level 0 40% 8000  
Above county level 0 30% 8000  
Datong Township 100 40% 15000  
County level 300 35% 15000  
Above county level 500 30% 15000  





Table 3 Socio-economic features of sampled population, China, 2005 
 
Yuexi Qianjiang Datong Three counties 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Sample size 143 148 89 201 126 174 358 523 
Average age  40.6 40.8 54.4 40.9 45.4 36.9 45.7 39.6 
Percentage of male inpa-
tients (%) 
60.1 48.3 69.3 42.1 59.2 50.0 62.1 46.5 
Proportion of absolutely 
poor inpatients (%) 
19.6 - 68.5 - 100.0 - 59.8 - 
Average annual house-
hold  income* (CNY) 
10015.8 15965.3 5926.4 16775.9 5298.6 10759.3 7052.2 14556.6 
Average annual house-
hold expenditure (CNY) 
17263.9 20900.7 6512.7 16110.2 9639.3 10598.3 11905.4 15641.3 
Percentage of households 
who have debt due to 
illness (%)  
67.0 48.3 75.9 39.5 79.1 73.4 76.4 59.9 
Data source: questionnaire survey 
* The aaverage annual household income in poor households includes all kinds of living subsidies 
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Table 4 Annual expenditure and reimbursement for hospitalization in three counties, China 
(2005, unit: CNY)  
 Yuexi Qianjiang Datong Three counties 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Direct medical expenses  A 6114.2 4119.9 1559.0 1400.9 5719.9 3497.4 4829.7 2871.1 
Transportation and caring fee for 
hospitalization  B 
1039.5 1198.4 190.4 301.3 941.7 575.4 785.6 643.1 
Self-purchased drug expenses C 207.6 159.3 50.3 26.3 10.7 65.3 99.2 76.9 
Total expenses for hospitalization  
D 
7533.0 5574.10 1799.7 1731.8 6737.2 4080.0 5757.1 3601.4 
Proportion of direct non-medical 
expenditure to total hospitalization 
(B+C)/D 
22.3% 24.1% 14.9% 18.4% 18.1% 17.5% 18.8% 19.6% 
Proportion of total hospitalization 
expenditure to annual household 
expenditure 
44.1% 27.7% 25.3% 14.6% 57.8% 37.5% 44.1% 26.1% 
Reimbursement from NCMS  E 1168.8 800.7 379.0 429.1 1211.6 718.4 978.2 625.0 
Effective reim-








15.6% 14.6% 48.1% 35.8% 20.3% 20.2% 26.1% 24.9% 
Subsidies related to healthcare 
from other sources 
122.0 0 72.1 0 1441.2 0 573.9 0 




Table 5 Head count* of catastrophic health expenditure in three counties, China, 2005 
  Yuexi Qianjiang Datong Average 
Poor Before reimbursement (P1) 89.2% 62.5% 99.2% 85.8% 
After reimbursement from NCMS (P2) 85.6% 33.3% 95.0% 75.1% 
After reimbursement from NCMS and 
other sources (P3) 
85.6% 31.0% 90.8% 72.9% 
Non-poor Before reimbursement (N1) 78.4% 39.1% 83.8% 65.3% 
After reimbursement from NCMS 
(N2) 
73.9% 27.9% 80.2% 58.3% 
Differences P1-P2 3.6% 29.2% 4.2% 10.8% 
P2-P3 0.0% 2.3% 4.2% 2.2% 
N1-N2 4.5% 11.2% 3.6% 7.0% 





Table 6 Overshoot* of catastrophic health expenditure in three counties, China, 2005 
  Yuexi Qianjiang Datong Average 
Poor Before reimbursement (A) 34.8% 17.0% 47.8% 34.8% 
After reimbursement from NCMS (B) 
26.7% 8.0% 36.8% 25.4% 
After reimbursement from NCMS and 
other sources (C) 
25.8% 7.3% 24.0% 20.2% 
Non-poor Before reimbursement (A’) 18.4% 8.3% 28.0% 17.9% 
After reimbursement from NCMS (B’) 
14.8% 5.4% 20.9% 13.4% 
Differences A-B 8.2% 8.9% 11.1% 9.4% 
B-C 0.8% 0.7% 12.8% 5.2% 
A’-B’ 3.7% 2.9% 7.1% 4.5% 
* Overshoot refers to the average extent to which the CHE is above the 10% threshold. 
 
 
